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An efficiency rationale for expenditure equalization 
 
 




This paper provides an efficiency rationale for expenditure equalization in 
federations.  It does so by developing a fiscal federalism model with two citizen 
types; immobile non-workers and mobile workers.  Three decision-makers, a federal 
transfer authority and two states, play a game as Nash competitors.  In any Nash 
Equilibrium the federal authority chooses an efficient transfer that 'equalizes' for 
inter-state differences in state benefit and redistributive taxes as well as differences 
in per capita revenues (economic rents).   Since state taxes are equal to per capita 
state expenditures on services this provides an efficiency rationale for expenditure 
equalization.  Using examples it is shown that Australian equalization gets 
expenditure equalization in the 'right' direction from an efficiency perspective; from 
low to high cost states.  This is not to say, however, that the magnitude of inter-state 
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Most real-world schemes of fiscal equalization focus on equalizing revenue-raising 
capacities of states or provinces.  This is true, for example, in Canada, Switzerland 
and Germany.  An exception, Australia, also equalizes for inter-state differences in 
the expenditures undertaken by states to provide services.  This has been criticized 
as inefficient because it moves resources to high cost states [Gramlich (1984)].  
Recent reviews have rejected extensions to the Canadian model to allow for 
expenditure equalization on the grounds that it invites strategic behavior by states, is 
overly complex and would have no material impact on that country's transfers.3   
 This paper swims against the tide and provides an efficiency rationale for 
expenditure equalization.  It starts by developing a model of a federation with three 
decision-makers: two state governments and a federal transfer authority.  There are 
two citizen types, mobile workers who contribute to output and earn income and 
immobile 'non-workers' who do not participate in the labour market and earn no 
income.  An exogenous utility target for non-workers is satisfied through federal and 
state redistribution.  Federal redistribution is by way of a uniform and given 
(federal) tax on workers that provides a private consumption good for non-workers.  
State redistribution is by way of a congested service provided to non-workers and 
funded by a separate (state specific) redistributive tax on workers.  This division of 
the redistributive task reflects the assignment of the welfare function in Australia 
where the federal government redistributes via cash subsidies that pay for 
consumption (e.g. unemployment, disability, child support benefits) and states 
redistribute principally through the direct provision of services (e.g. public housing, 
transport).  Each state also levies a separate benefit tax on workers to pay for a 
congested service provided specifically to this group.  The general results hold with 
other assumptions about the assignment of redistribution between governments. 
 A policy game is played in which the decision-makers are benevolent Nash 
competitors.  The federal authority chooses an inter-state transfer to maximize 
mobile worker welfare subject to an equal utility condition for mobile workers, state 
feasibility, anticipated worker location choices and the utility target for non workers, 
                                                        
3 See, for example: Achieving a National Purpose: Putting Equalization Back on Track (2006).    
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for given state policies.  States choose their public services and taxes to maximize 
worker welfare subject to the same constraints faced by the transfer authority, given 
the inter-state transfer.  In a Nash outcome states choose the benefit tax that funds 
the public service provided to workers and the redistributive tax to pay for the public 
service for non-workers.  From the perspective of workers the redistributive tax is a 
negative externality, a fiscal burden they bear without benefit.  The redistributive tax 
in a particular state acts as a deterrent for inwardly migrating workers.  A Nash 
Equilibrium (NE) is characterized in which the federal transfer authority chooses an 
efficient inter-state transfer.      
 The results of the paper follow.  The efficient inter-state transfer is shown to 
'equalize' inter-state differences in the state benefit and redistributive taxes as well as 
per capita state revenues (economic rents).   Since state taxes are equal to per capita 
expenditures on state services this provides the efficiency rationale for expenditure 
equalization for both workers and non-workers.  The paper then shows how inter-
state differences in social marginal costs for state services influence the direction of 
the efficient expenditure equalization transfer.  Two numerical examples are used.  
The first starts with a symmetric equilibrium and increases the social marginal cost 
of the service provided to workers in one state relative to the other.  It is shown that 
the efficient transfer must move income (output) from the high to the low cost state.  
The second example starts with the same symmetric solution and increases the 
relative cost of the non-worker service in one state.  It is shown that the efficient 
transfer must now move income (output) in the opposite direction; from the low to 
high cost state.  Thus, the direction of the efficient transfer in response to differential 
inter-state costs is dependent on whether the service is provided to workers or non-
workers.  Since Australian equalization focuses on expenditure equalization with 
respect to citizens who are essentially non-workers, it is concluded that it has the 
general direction of transfers resulting from expenditure equalization correct.  This 
does not mean that the magnitude of those transfers is efficient. 
  The outline is as follows.  Section 2 sets up the basic federalism model.  
Section 3 characterizes the federal - state policy game.  Section 4 demonstrates the 
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efficiency rationale for expenditure equalization.  In Section 5 we present the 
numerical examples demonstrating the direction of transfer.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Model of a federation 
Assume a federation with two states  each of which has two citizen types 
differentiated by labor market participation.  Specifically, denote the two types as 
workers and non-workers.  Workers have identical preferences, are perfectly mobile 
across states, contribute to output by each supplying one unit of labor and earn 
income.4  Labor supply in state 1 is denoted by  and labor supply to state 2 is .  
The fixed supply of labor to the federation satisfies the constraint 
 .        (2.1) 
It is assumed that N, which is also the population of workers in the federation, is 
given and hence is a parameter of the model.   
 Non-workers have identical preferences that can differ from the preferences 
of workers.  Non-workers are immobile and because they do not participate in the 
labor market, earn no market income.  These citizens consume a private good 
provided by tax revenue raised on an equal per capita basis from workers across the 
federation.  They also consume a state provided public service funded by a state-
specific tax on workers.  Non-workers may be, for example, citizens less than 18 
years of age in secondary, primary or pre-school, people in retirement, the 
unemployed, recent migrants, those involved in unpaid work within families, 
citizens with disabilities or indigenous people living in traditional communities.  The 
(given) number of non-workers is denoted by  in state 1 and  in state 2.   
 Non-worker immobility could arise from strong attachment to place.  This is 
a reasonable approximation for citizens who make up this group.  Indigenous people 
are attached to traditional lands while the unemployed in large part do not move to 
                                                        
4 Models of fiscal federalism dichotomize state or provincial populations in various ways depending 
on the research question.  Making use of the efficiency wage concept the paper by Boadway, Cuff 
and Marchand (2002) postulates a model with two mobile worker types, one with low productivity 
and the other with high productivity.  Alternatively, Wildasin (1991) develops a model in which the 
population consists of poor and rich.  The poor are mobile and the rich immobile.  A dichotomy based 
on labor market participation is more useful for the purpose of this paper, 
1, 2i =
1n
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low unemployment regions.  There is evidence for this in Australia where the state 
of Tasmania has an unemployment rate persistently higher than other states.      
 The non-worker group could be disaggregated into n non-worker groups, for 
example, indigenous people, the aged and so on.  The results will still hold but for 
each non-worker type.  Such disaggregation introduces complexity without extra 
insight.  Alternatively, one might imagine that the non-worker group is just one of 
the sub-groups, for example, indigenous people.  Again the results do not change so 
the assumption of one homogenous non-working citizen type is retained.  
 This division of the population reflects the way Australian equalization 
implicitly divides the population.  Such a division drives much of the inter-state 
redistribution in Australia.  Since it pursues fiscal capacity equalization the 
Australian model compensates those states with relatively high numbers of people 
who are, effectively, non-workers.  Such people are deemed to place a high demand 
on state services.  To understand the efficiency of cost equalization a dichotomy of 
the population based on labor market participation is a useful way to proceed. 
 
2.1. State output, service benefits and the transfer 
The production process in each state uses one variable input; the labour supplied by 
workers.  Since the total national supply of workers is fixed and each worker 
supplies one unit of labour the only way labour supply to a state can vary is through 
inter-state migration.  There is another fixed input  that is thought of as natural 
resources.5  State output is defined by  but since  is fixed this becomes  
 .        (2.2) 
 Each worker receives a wage  equal to the marginal product of workers in 
the state.  This arises from the assumption that state labor markets are perfectly 
competitive.  Workers also earn an equal per capita share of any economic rent 
generated by the state's production process.  This rent is the un-priced return to the 
fixed factor of production, natural resources owned by the state.  The rent is state 
                                                        
5 Alternatively, the fixed input might be immobile capital or land.   
1, 2i =
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profit remaining after labor has been paid its wage.  The income of a worker in a 
state is equal to the state's average product as follows    
 .         (2.3) 
 Suppose each state has a benevolent government.  There is also a federal 
transfer authority that makes a lump sum self-financing inter-state from state 1 to 
state 2.  The transfer is denoted as .  Each state produces two public services, one 
for workers denoted as  and one for non-workers denoted as .  The output of 
services is linked to the benefit to workers and non-workers as follows 
 , .      (2.4) 
Here  is the benefit provided to workers from output  and  is the benefit to 
non-workers from output .  There are three cases: (i) , both services are 
pure public goods and , ; (ii) , both services are pure private 
goods and , ; and (iii)  and the services are impure 
public goods.  The output of each state service can also be expressed as        
 ,       (2.5) 
The social marginal cost of  is denoted by  and  is the social marginal cost of 
.  These social marginal costs are assumed to be parameters.6    
 
2.2. Utility and worker migration 
Workers have a quasi-concave, continuous and differentiable direct utility function 
defined over a private good  and the benefit received from the state service .  A 
worker's utility function is .  Since workers are perfectly mobile there is a 
constraint requiring per capita utility for these citizens to be identical across states7  
 .       (2.6) 
                                                        
6 An alternative would be to allow public service social marginal costs to vary with service output. 
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 Each non-worker has a quasi-concave continuous and differentiable direct 
utility function defined over a private good  and the benefit  from the state 
service.  Define  as the utility function of a non-worker and suppose there 
is a utility target for non-workers in each state such that    
 .         
 .       (2.7) 
Here  and  are assumed to be exogenous and perceived as given by states and 
the federal transfer authority.     
 The non-worker utility targets restrict the search for welfare maximizing 
state policies and federal inter-state transfers to outcomes that cannot make non-
workers worse-off or better off since the constraint holds with equality.  This is an 
important point and means we will look for inter-state transfers that make the 
workers as well off as feasible without changing non-worker utility.  By doing this 
he analysis avoids outcomes with undesirable equity effects.   
 There are two alternative ways to proceed.  First we could ensure the 
preservation of non-workers interests by including their well being in the public 
choice process; for example through an objective function for the states and the 
federal authority defined over worker and non-worker utility.  This leads to well-
known issues relating to welfare functions and the welfare target approach is 
preferred.  Second we could allow the constraints to hold as inequalities requiring 
non-worker welfare to be greater than or equal to the respective targets.  The 
preference is to solve the model with equality constraints.  We are able to show that 
an efficient transfer makes workers better off for given non-worker utility.  The 
efficient transfer is Pareto improving implying that it creates a welfare surplus some 
of which could in principle be used to make non-workers better off.  Given this it 
suffices that the non-worker utility targets are equalities and that we can show that 
an efficient is Pareto improving.       
 Apart from this theoretical appeal non-worker welfare targets have a natural 
interpretation.  One might suppose that  and  arise from cultural norms about 
the standard of living (in utility terms) non-workers should enjoy.  Societies have 
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accepted ways of providing for the unemployed, the aged or indigenous citizens.  
They would not entertain inter-state transfers that make these citizens worse off.  
This is certainly so in Australia.  With this motivation it is reasonable to assume that 
cultural norms are also uniform across the federation.  The search for welfare 
maximizing transfers is further restricted with the assumption that   
 .        (2.8)     
 In Australia, as in many federations, the private consumption of non-workers 
is met via cash transfers (e.g. unemployment benefits, disability pensions, child care 
support) through the federal welfare system.  Non-workers receive cash benefits and 
convert them into private consumption.  Most services they access are provided by 
states, for example education, health, public transport and public housing.  To reflect 
this we assume that  and  are chosen by the federal government exogenous to 
the model.  Since non-workers are the same in each state we suppose that 
.  The federal government provides the same per capita quantity of 
private good to non-workers regardless of where they live.  Given (2.7) and (2.8) 
this implies .  This does not imply the same service output across states.   
 
2.3. Taxes and feasibility 
Taxes must be paid in each state to fund state local public services and the non-
worker private good provided by the federal government.  Since only workers 
participate in the labor market and earn income they pay these taxes.  In this respect 
total expenditure in a state on the service provided to workers is defined as 
 and if one assumes workers meet this cost on an equal per capita basis 
the tax paid by each worker for their own public service is  
        (2.9) 
This is a benefit tax in the sense that workers receive a benefit in terms of a public 
service for the tax they pay.  The tax is equal to the total per capita expenditure by 
the state on the service.   




 State expenditure on the service provided to non-workers is .   
Assuming workers alone meet these costs on an equal per capita basis the tax paid 
by them to fund the non-worker state public service is   
 .      (2.10) 
This is the redistributive tax that workers pay so that the state can provide  to meet 
the welfare target for non-workers conditional the value of .  As with the benefit 
tax this is just total per capita expenditure by the state on the service.  Though 
 this does not mean that each state levies the same tax on workers to 
provide this benefit to non-workers.  This can be seen from (2.10) where the tax 
varies across states because of different non-worker populations, costs of producing 
the output that creates the benefit and worker populations (taxpayers).  Generally, 
 and the per capita redistributive tax on workers differs across states even 
though the benefit of the service to non-workers is the same regardless of location.  
 Assume that the price of the worker and non-worker private good is one.  
Total expenditure on the non-worker private good is  so the federal 
redistributive tax paid by a worker (regardless of location) is  
 .      (2.11)  
Since  is exogenous and ,  and N are parameters, T is given for the states 
and the federal transfer authority (hence no state subscript).  
 The budget constraint of a state inclusive of federal and state taxes and the 
inter-state transfer is  
  .     (2.12)  
If  then the transfer is away from state .  Since by assumption the transfer is 
self-financing it must in this case be in favor of state .  Conversely, if  then 
the inter-state transfer is from state  to state .  Private good consumption for 
each worker in a state is  




 .     (2.13) 
Per capita worker private good consumption is equal to their income (average 
product) plus their per capita share of the inter-state transfer (positive or negative) 
less the federal tax paid for private consumption of non-workers and the two state 
taxes; one to pay for their own public service and the redistributive tax to provide 
the non-worker state service.  
 
3. Federal - state policy game 
We now set up a game in which the states and federal authority choose their policies 
simultaneously as Nash competitors.  There is no strategic behavior on the part of 
any players.  The choice variables of the states are  and  while  is the choice 
variable of the federal transfer authority.  The authority takes  and  as given 
when making its transfer choice.  State 1 takes  and  as given when choosing  
and state 2 takes  and  as given when choosing .  The federal authority and 
the states correctly anticipate worker location migration responses to changes in 
their policies.  The parameter set of this game is 
 .     (3.1) 
The set consists of state public service social marginal costs, non-worker 
populations, congestion parameters, the federal non-worker utility target and non-
worker private good consumption.     
      From the equal utility condition for workers the supply of workers to each 
state is a continuous and differentiable function of state policies and the inter-state 
transfer conditional on the parameters.  This allows one to define  
   
 .       (3.2) 
The labour supply functions are needed in order to show how the transfer is chosen.     
 The federal authority's choice is constrained by worker migration and the 
equal utility condition for workers.  It knows from this that the transfer choice is 
1, 2i =
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subject to the equal per capita utility condition for workers.  A transfer that 
maximizes worker utility in one state also maximizes worker welfare in the other.  
The authority can choose the transfer to maximize per capita worker utility in either 
state.  The choice is the same whether state 1 or 2 is chosen as the decision state.  
  
3.1 Federal authority transfer choice 
Given this it is assumed that the authority solves  
   
Subject to: 
 (i) . 
 (ii)  
 (iii)  
 (iv)    
 (v)         (3.3) 
 The first constraint is the worker equal utility condition.  The second and 
third constraints are the state feasibility conditions inclusive of the inter-state 
transfer.  The transfer is assumed to run from state 1 to state 2.  The feasibility 
constraints require total consumption in each state to be equal to state output net of 
the transfer.  The fourth constraint is the (given) non-worker utility target.  The last 
constraint requires that all workers are located in a state.  The authority chooses the 
transfer to make equal per capita utility for workers as large as possible.  A critical 
value for  from this optimization must satisfy each constraint.      
 To solve, rewrite constraint (ii) in terms of per capita worker private good 
consumption in state 1, substitute into the objective function and differentiate with 
respect to the inter-state transfer taking state policies as given.  The first order 
necessary condition (FONC) or best response function for the inter-state transfer is 
 .        (3.4) 
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The partial derivative captures the state 1 worker supply response to an incremental 
change in the inter-state transfer.  The second term  is the net marginal social 
benefit for state 1 of a change in its supply of workers.  This is defined as  
 .       (3.5) 
The right side of (3.5) is the marginal product (wage) of workers and the next term is 
their per capita private good consumption.  The last term is the (congestion-adjusted) 
per capita tax paid by workers for their public service.   
 The labor supply response to a change in the transfer is obtained by 
expressing each state feasible condition in (3.3) in terms of per capita worker private 
consumption.  Using the resulting expressions in the worker equal utility condition 
and differentiating with respect to the transfer yields 
 
       (3.6)  
In this expression 
  , .  (3.7) 
Here  is the net marginal social benefit for state 2 of an incremental change in its 
worker supply, analogous to  in interpretation.  
 Given this the left side of the FONC (3.4) is the net marginal social benefit 
for state 1 of an incremental change in the inter-state transfer and the right side is the 
social marginal cost (equal to one).  The optimal transfer is the value of  that 
equates the net marginal social benefit with marginal cost, that is, satisfies equation 
(3.4) for given state policies and worker location choices.  Making use of the labor 
supply response (3.6) in (3.4) one can express the FONC for the transfer as   
   .        (3.8) 
The transfer ensures an allocation of mobile workers across states such that (3.8) is 
satisfied, namely, the social marginal benefit of adding a worker to state 1 is equal to 
the social marginal benefit of adding a worker to state 2.  
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3.2 State fiscal policies 
State 1 chooses  to maximize  for given , conditional on the 
parameters of the problem and subject to the constraints (i) to (vi) from (3.3).  The 
solution proceeds by expressing constraint (ii) in terms of per capita worker 
consumption.  This is then substituted into the objective function.  Differentiation 
with respect to each state policy yields the FONC (best response) for  as 
 .      (3.9) 
State 2 solves an analogous problem yielding the FONC for  as  
 .     (3.10)  
The migration response terms are derived in Appendix A from the equal utility 
condition.  Using them the FONCs for  and  become, following manipulation,     
 ,  .   (3.11) 
The left side of each FONC is the marginal social benefit of the public service while 
the right side is the marginal social cost.  These FONCs (Samuelson conditions) 
must be satisfied in a solution to the optimization problems of the states.  
    
3.3. Optimality 
We now define a Nash Equilibrium (NE) to the policy game and examine optimality 
of any equilibrium.  Start with 
  
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium): The transfer authority chooses  to solve the 
maximization problem (3.3).  The solution at (3.8), a best response, defines a 
correspondence  between the strategy of the authority and the 
strategies of states 1 and 2.  State 1 chooses  to maximize  subject to 
constraints (i) to (v) from (3.3.) and state 2 solves an analogous maximization 
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problems.  The solutions (best responses) at (3.11) also define correspondences 
 and  between the strategy of each state and the 
strategies of the authority and the neighbouring state.  A Nash Equilibrium is a 
solution  such that ,  and 
.  
  
  Any NE to the game is Pareto optimal.  This can be seen by referring to 
Appendix B where we solve the problem of a mythical central planner and derive 
the FONCs for a Pareto optimum for this federation.  From the solution it is apparent 
that all of these conditions are satisfied in a NE to the game.  Workers are allocated 
efficiently across states and services are provided consistent with Samuelson 
conditions.  Any NE to the policy game is Pareto optimal and yields an outcome on 
the UPF defined between a representative worker and non-worker in each state.  
 This arises because the federal authority and states are assumed to be 
benevolent and do not act strategically with respect to each other's choices.  With 
alternative assumptions in relation to benevolence or strategic behavior it is unlikely 
the transfer authority would choose an efficient transfer, or that states would adopt 
efficient public service provision.  Any NE to a game with malevolent decision 
makers or strategic behavior will not in general be Pareto optimal. 
 This is of no concern for the purpose here.  We have deliberately 
characterized a Pareto optimal equilibrium free of public choice and strategic 
behavior distortions in order to focus on the efficient transfer and the way that 
differences in inter-state costs affect that transfer.  This allows the result that cost 
equalization has an efficiency rationale to be presented in the clearest manner.  To 
examine the same question in the presence of non-benevolence and strategic 
behavior is beyond the scope of the paper.  
   
4. Expenditure equalization: efficiency rationale 
We now show that the efficient inter-state transfer 'equalizes' for inter-state 
differences in the per capita expenditure on each service thus providing an efficiency 
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rationale for expenditure equalization.  In Appendix C the FONC for the inter-state 
transfer is re-derived in terms of fiscal and economic rent externalities yielding  
. (4.1)  
The right hand side of the efficient transfer equation consists of terms that capture 
inter-state differences in the fiscal externalities generated by the benefit and 
redistributive taxes and economic rents.  The equation is standard except for the 
inclusion of the redistributive taxes.8  Each term is explained below.9  
(i) Benefit tax fiscal externality: Consider the term .  The 
variable  is the benefit tax paid by each worker in state 1.  This provides a 
positive fiscal externality for all existing workers in the state depending on the value 
of alpha.  The variable  is the benefit tax paid by each worker in state 2.  This 
too is a positive fiscal externality for all existing workers in the state depending on 
the value of alpha.  The term  is the congestion - adjusted 
difference between the per capita benefit tax in states 1 and 2.  When  (pure 
public good) each of these taxes confers a positive fiscal externality on all other 
workers in their respective states which is equal to their tax payment.  If  the 
service has a private and public good aspect and the benefit tax paid by a worker 
provides a positive fiscal externality to all other workers in each state that is less 
than the tax payment.  When  (private good) the tax contribution of a worker 
generates no fiscal externality and .  The effect of inter-state 
differences in the benefit tax, and the fiscal externalities generated by those benefit 
taxes cancels from the efficient transfer equation.  Some might argue that this is a 
reasonable assumption to make for many services provided by states to workers.  In 
the interests of generality we leave this term in the efficient transfer equation.  As 
noted above this term is a well-known determinant of the efficient transfer.     
                                                        
8 See Boadway (2004). 
9 The federal worker tax T is not an argument of the efficient transfer equation because this tax is 
uniform across states and has no influence on migration decisions. 
1α <
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(ii) Redistributive tax fiscal externality: Now consider .  This is the 
difference in the redistributive tax paid by a worker in state 1 versus state 2.  From 
the perspective of non-workers this tax represents a positive fiscal externality 
created by each worker.  From the perspective of workers this is a negative 
externality that they face when migrating into a state.  The tax is an impost on 
workers required to fund the public service for non-workers for which they receive 
no benefit.10  The tax acts as a deterrent for workers to enter a state.  This term is not 
a well known determinant of the efficient transfer mainly because most fiscal 
federalism models used to examine the efficiency case for inter-state transfers do not 
allow for intra-state redistribution and the redistributive taxes needed to support such 
redistribution.  
(iii) Economic rent externality: The last two terms capture the difference in per 
capita economic rents across the states.  If rents do not accrue to state governments 
then they have no influence on worker location choices and drop out of the efficient 
transfer equation.11  This too is a well-known determinant of an efficient transfer. 
 Thus, the efficient inter-state transfer is a function of differences in the per 
capita benefit and redistributive taxes levied on workers and per capita economic 
rents.  Recall from (2.9) and (2.10) that these taxes are equal to the per capita 
expenditure by each state on the services provided to workers and non-workers.  
This means that the components of the efficient transfer equation that relate to the 
differences in taxes, namely, (i) and (ii) above, can be thought the expenditure 
equalization part of the efficient transfer.  The component that relates to the 
differences in inter-state economic rents is the revenue equalization component of 
the efficient transfer.  Hence, efficient equalization requires that per capita 
expenditures on services and revenue (rents) be 'equalized' by the inter-state transfer.  
Both expenditure and revenue (rent) equalization are justified on efficiency grounds 
leading to the following theorem   
                                                        
10 Workers are not altruistic by assumption. 
11 This is unlikely to be the case in Australia particularly in the resource rich states of Western 
Australia and Queensland.  These states contain virtually all the country's iron ore and coal resources.  
That said the Mineral Resource Rent Tax (MMRT) could conceivably capture these rents implying 
they should not enter the efficient transfer equation.  At present this is not the case.  The MMRT and 
the states capture a portion of state-specific rents from mineral extraction.  An efficient equalization 
scheme in Australia should retain the rent terms.  
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Theorem 1 (Expenditure equalization): An efficient inter-state transfer must 
'equalize' account for inter-state differences in per capita expenditures on state 
public services.   
 
 The efficient transfer will not necessarily result in equal actual per capita 
expenditures across states for each public service.  This is because there are two 
public services and because economic rents are present.  It is total per capita service 
expenditures and rents that must be equalized across states.   
 
5. The direction of expenditure equalization transfers 
 In this section we examine how inter-state differences in social marginal costs of 
service provision affect the direction of the efficient inter-state transfer given that 
the transfer has two components; expenditure and revenue (rent) equalization.  Of 
particular interest is whether the efficient transfer overall should favor high or low 
cost states.  This permits conclusions about the efficiency of real-world equalization 
schemes that incorporate expenditure equalization.      
 To do this requires that we analyze how changes in the prices of state 
services, , ,  and  affect the NE values of the endogenous variables to the 
game, including the efficient transfer , the key choice variable of interest.  As 
shown, the efficient transfer is determined as part of a system of simultaneous 
equations (best response functions).  For this reason proceeding analytically is 
problematic and yields few insights so we construct a numerical example using the 
functional forms ,  and .  Details 
of the example are provided in Appendix D.   
 Two comparative static exercises are examined.  The first shows how 
changes in the social marginal cost of the service provided to workers in one state 
relative to the other state affects the efficient inter-state transfer.  The second 
examines how changes in the social marginal cost of the service provided to non-
workers in one state relative to the other affects the efficient transfer.  The direction 
of the transfer differs for each case.   
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5.1. State service for workers 
Table 1 presents the results of the first simulation.  This starts with a symmetric 
solution (row 1) where all parameters have the values given below the Table.  The 
efficient transfer is zero ( ) since inter-state externalities are equated.  Free 
migration leads to an efficient outcome when states are the same and the federal 
transfer authority has no efficiency role.   
  
 Table 1: Efficient Transfer and Inter-State Differences in the Cost of the 
Worker State Service 
            
10 0.0000 30.0000 1.9919 1.9919 0.0280 0.0280 1.9919 1.9919 0.2799 0.2799 0.5575 
12 -2.1535 31.0035 1.9006 2.0890 0.0271 0.0289 1.9006 2.0890 0.2679 0.2438 0.5092 
14 -3.9702 31.8513 1.8276 2.1758 0.0264 0.0298 1.8276 2.1758 0.2583 0.2170 0.4721 
16 -5.5382 32.5847 1.7672 2.2548 0.0258 0.0306 1.7672 2.2548 0.2504 0.1962 0.4425 
18 -6.9150 33.2305 1.7161 2.3275 0.0253 0.0314 1.7161 2.3275 0.2436 0.1796 0.4180 
Parameter values: , , ,    
 .  
  
 We then increase  from 10 to 18.  Associated values for the endogenous 
variables are presented in the rest of the Table.  The other parameters are held fixed 
at the values noted.  Consistent with proposition 1 the first result is that an efficient 
transfer should equalize for differences in the inter-state marginal cost of providing 
the public service to workers.  The transfer is increasing in the difference between  
and  with negative sign implying that the efficient transfer should reallocate 
income from the 'high cost' state in favor of the 'low cost' state.   
 The intuition is as follows.  From the symmetric solution an increase in  
reduces real income for workers in state 2.  For given values of the endogenous 
variables this implies  and .  From the equal utility condition for 
workers this inequality cannot hold.  Workers react to the real income signal and 
migrate from state 2 to state 1 until a new equality is established.  The benefit tax  
decreases as more taxpayers enter state 1 while  increases as taxpayers leave state 
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2.  The redistributive tax  decreases as taxpayers enter state 1 to share the given 
redistributive task in that state.  In contrast  increases as fewer taxpayers 
contribute to the redistributive task in that state.  Per capita worker consumption  
increases as workers leave state 2 because per capita consumption in each state is 
decreasing in worker supply.  Conversely  decreases as workers migrate into state 
1.  State service provision to workers decreases as  increases because states 
substitute their expenditure mix away from the public service in favor of 
consumption for workers (a movement around an indifference curve defined over  
and ).  These responses re-establish the equal utility equality.  
 Equal per capita utility for workers is decreasing in  so workers are 
unambiguously worse off with a higher public service price in state 2 despite the 
migration response.  This is shown in the last column of the Table.  Non-worker 
utility is kept constant at  throughout the simulation.  That said the solution 
in each row of Table 1 is Pareto optimal.  While equal per capita worker utility falls 
as the cost of the worker public service in state 2 increases the decline would be 
greater with any other inter-state transfer including one equal to zero.  Pareto 
optimality requires a transfer to the state with the lower marginal cost for the public 
service provided to workers.  Migration and the efficient transfer minimize the 
impact of the increased cost on worker welfare for given non-worker welfare.   
 One feature of the example requires more explanation.  In each solution other 
than the symmetric one  and .  From the efficient transfer 
equation (4.1) these signs tend to induce a positive transfer from state 1 to state 2.  
Yet this is not what happens.  We must also consider the impact of migration on per 
capita rents in each state.  Per capita rent is decreasing in worker supply.  From the 
symmetric solution (row 1) as workers leave state 2 and enter state 1 per capita rent 
in state 2 increases and per capita rent decreases in state 1.  Since they are equal in 
the symmetric solution this implies that in all the other solutions (rows 3 to 6 of 
Table 1) we have 
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 .        (5.1)     
This difference increases as  increases.  From (4.1) this tends to make the transfer 
negative.  The simulation shows that this difference in per capita rent, stimulated by 
the outflow of workers from state 2 in response to the initial income signal, 
dominates the impact of  and  on the efficient transfer.  This is 
why the equilibrium transfer is negative and favors the low cost state.  The following 
theorem can be stated  
 
Theorem 2: The efficient inter-state transfer should transfer income (output) from 
states with a relatively high social marginal cost of producing the service provided to 
workers, in favor of states with a relatively low social marginal cost of producing 
worker services.  
 
5.2. State service for non-workers 
Table 2 presents the results of the second example.  This starts with the same 
symmetric solution as the first simulation (row 1 of Table 2) where all parameters 
have the values given below the Table.  The simulation then increases , the 
marginal cost of the service provided by states to non-workers, from 10 to 18.   
Values for the endogenous variables are presented in the rest of the Table while the 
other parameters are fixed at the values stated. 
 
Table 2: Efficient Transfer and Inter-State Differences in the Cost of the Non-
Worker State Service 
            
10 0.0000 30.0000 1.9919 1.9919 0.0280 0.0280 1.9919 1.9919 0.2799 0.2799 0.5575 
12 0.0127 30.0295 1.9905 1.9906 0.0279 0.0336 1.9905 1.9906 0.2797 0.2797 0.5567 
14 0.0255 30.0590 1.9890 1.9893 0.0279 0.0392 1.9890 1.9893 0.2795 0.2795 0.5559 
16 0.0383 30.0886 1.9875 1.9880 0.0279 0.0449 1.9875 1.9880 0.2793 0.2793 0.5551 
18 0.0511 30.1183 1.9860 1.9867 0.0279 0.0506 1.9860 1.9867 0.2792 0.2792 0.5545 
Parameter values: , , ,    
 .  
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 The main result here is that the efficient transfer is now from the low cost to 
the high cost state.  The intuition is as follows.  From the symmetric solution an 
increase in  reduces the benefit received from a given output of the non-worker 
public service.  To keep the benefit constant as required by the non-worker utility 
target state 2 must increase the redistributive tax  on workers to increase output of 
the service.  This keeps the benefit constant at the higher price but reduces  
relative to  implying that  for given values of the endogenous 
variables.  Workers react to the tax (price) signal and migrate from state 2 to state 1 
to escape the higher redistributive tax until a new equality is established.  The 
population of state 1 increases and the population of state 2 decreases.   
 At each solution apart from the symmetric case in row 1 we have  
and  as in the first simulation.  This tends to make the transfer positive:  
from state 1 to state 2 (high cost to low cost).  Again per capita rents in state 2 are 
higher than in state 1 as they were in the first simulation and (7.1) holds, tending to 
make the transfer negative.  But now the impact of  and  
outweigh the effect of the difference in rents and the transfer is positive, namely, 
from the low cost to the high cost state.    
 Once more each solution in Table 1 is Pareto optimal.  While equal per 
capita worker falls as the cost of the non-worker public service in state 2 increases 
the decline is less than would be the case with any other transfer.  Non-worker utility 
remains constant throughout the simulation so these citizens are not made worse off 
or better off as the cost of meeting their utility target (in state 2) increases.  An 
increasing cost in state 2 makes workers worse off, requires a transfer to the high 
cost state and leaves non-worker utility unchanged.  As with the first simulation, 
workers are made worse off but the efficient transfer minimizes this welfare loss.  On 
welfare grounds one would always implement the efficient transfer since this makes 
workers as well off as possible in the face of rising costs in one state while holding 
the non-worker utility constant.  This leads to the following  
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Theorem 3: The efficient inter-state transfer should transfer income (output) from 
states with a relatively low social marginal cost of producing the service provided to 
non-workers and in favor of states with a relatively high social marginal cost of 
producing non-worker services.  
 
5.3. Policy implications - Australian equalization 
To the extent that Australian equalization is driven by inter-state differences in the 
costs associated with providing services to workers it transfers income (output) in 
the 'wrong' direction from efficiency perspective.  However, to the extent that it is 
driven by inter-state differences in the costs related to services for non-workers it 
transfers income (output) in the 'right' direction from an efficiency point of view.  
One could argue that Australian expenditure equalization is dominated by inter-state 
cost differences for services provided to non-workers and hence that in general 
terms the expenditure component of the Australian model transfers income in the 
correct direction from an efficiency point of view (from low to high cost states).  
Indeed, if one believes that alpha is equal to zero so that services provided to 
workers are pure private goods then expenditure equalization should only equalize 
for differences in non-worker service costs, and this is what Australian equalization 
does.   
6. Conclusion 
The paper has modelled a federal economy with two citizen types; immobile non-
workers and mobile workers.  This, essentially, is how the Australian equalization 
model divides state populations when undertaking cost equalization.  There are three 
benevolent decision makers who play a game as Nash competitors - a federal 
transfer authority and two states.  In any Nash Equilibrium the federal authority 
chooses an efficient transfer that is a function of inter-state differences in per capita 
benefit and redistributive taxes and per capita economic rents.  Since per capita taxes 
are equal to per capita state expenditures on state services this means that efficient 
equalization should incorporate expenditure and revenue (rent) equalisation.  Using 
numerical examples it is shown that the expenditure component of an efficient 
transfer is a function of inter-state differences in the social marginal cost of service 
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provision.  The efficient transfer should favour high cost states for non-workers 
services and low cost states for worker services.  Thus, Australian equalization gets 
the transfer in the right direction for state services provided to non-workers but in 
the wrong direction for services provided to workers.  Since Australian equalization 
is skewed towards estimating expenditure needs for non-workers, one can conclude 
that, in general, its expenditure equalization transfers are in the 'correct' direction.   
 Future work would consider how these results might be modified by relaxing 
three assumptions made in this paper, namely, that redistribution to non-workers is 
exogenous, that decision makers are benevolent and, finally, that there is no strategic 
behaviour.  All could be fruitful avenues of endeavour to see how the case for 
expenditure equalization is modified, if at all, by relaxation of these assumptions.      
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Appendix A: Migration responses to state policies 
 
Let us express constraints (ii) and (iii) from (3.3) from the main text in terms of per 
capita worker consumption in state 1 and 2.  These expressions are then substituted 
into the equal utility condition.  Differentiating the equal utility condition with 
















Appendix B: Pareto optimal solution 
 
A mythical central planner is assumed to be able to choose private good 
consumption for all household types in both states as well as provision of all four 
public services.  The planner can also choose  and  directly - they are choice 
variables and not endogenous functions of policies as in the game in the main text.  
The planner is constrained by private location decisions and respects the equal utility 
condition for mobile workers as well as the utility target for non-workers.  The 
planner will find a Pareto optimal outcome on the UPF defined between workers and 
non-workers in each state.  Formally the planner solves  
         
Subject to: 
 (i)  
     
(iii)  
(iv)   
(v) .       (A.1)  
The Lagrange function is: 
 
The FONCs are: 
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      (A.15) 
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.      (A.17) 
Combining (3) and (5) yields the FONC for the provision of  in state 1 as  
 .        (A.18)  
Combining (4) and (6) yields the FONC for provision of  in state 1 as  
 
.       (A.19) 
Using (7) to (10) yields the FONCs for the provision of  and  in state 2:  
 
, .    (A.20) 
Conditions (11) and (12) imply that the allocation of mobile Type 1 workers across 
the two states must satisfy 
 .       (A.21) 
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 ,  . 
The terms  and  are the net marginal social benefit of adding a worker to state 
1 and state 2 respectively.  Pareto optimality requires that these social marginal 
benefits be equal.  In summary, a Pareto optimal equilibrium requires efficient 
service provision according to the FONCs (A.18) to (A.20) and that workers are 
allocated efficiently across states consistent with (A.21).  These conditions still 
define the Pareto optimum when the  constraint is included.  Given that 
 this will also imply .  Such a solution is a special case of 










Appendix C: Migration externalities 
 
Assuming constant returns economic rent or profit in state 1 is  
 .     (B.1)  
Here  is the profit of state 1.  Dividing through by  and 
rearranging implies that per capita worker income (average product)12 is as follows 
 .       (B.2) 
Per capita private good consumption for a worker in state 1 can now be defined as  
 .    (B.3) 
This implies 
 .    (B.4) 
Using this (3.5) in the main text becomes  
 .    (B.5) 
A similar analysis for state 2 yields 
 .    (B.6) 
Using these expressions the FONC in proposition 1, namely,  becomes 
. (B.7) 
Rearranging yields the efficient transfer as per equation (4.1) in the main text. 
                                                        
12 Recall that average product is equal to per capita income for workers by assumption. 
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Appendix D: Numerical model 
 
From the game in the main text and using the assumed functional forms for utility 
and output the numerical example has the following equations: 
Transfer:   
State Taxes: .       
  . 
  . 
  . 
Rents:  . 
  .  
State services: .  
  . 
  .     
Migration: .    
Feasibility: . 
  . 
The vectors of unknowns and parameters are (respectively): 
  
 . 
The example is solved using MATLAB conditional on given parameter values and 
initial values for the unknowns.  The first solution of interest is a symmetric 
equilibrium.  Comparative statics are then undertaken to see how the values of the 
unknowns react to changes in particular parameters of the game while keeping other 
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